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Abstract 
Information technology (IT) has significant potential to improve the quality of patient care, to 
lower costs, and to improve efficiency. However, IT leaves an electronic paper trail that may 
demonstrate negligence and thereby create legal risk. Emerging research suggests that this fear of 
electronic discovery is delaying IT adoption, thereby perpetuating inefficiencies. Is this fear 
founded? If it is, then policy changes are needed to remove this obstacle to streamlining the 
healthcare system. If not, then healthcare providers should move ahead to realize IT benefits 
without being stymied by irrational fears. We examined the relationship between Computerized 
Physician Order Entry (CPOE) and malpractice claims against hospitals in Florida between 1999 
and 2006. CPOE reduces the number, severity, and disposition time of claims, while having no 
effect on the amounts paid. This indicates that CPOE reduces hospital legal risk, suggesting that 
fears of increased legal risk due to IT are unfounded. 
Keywords:  healthcare; electronic discovery; information systems adoption; legal environment 
 
Introduction 
One of the criticisms of the health care system in the United States is that it is antiquated and does not properly 
leverage information technology (IT). IT has the potential to improve patient care, to cut costs, and to enhance 
efficiency. The benefits of IT should accrue to all parties: patients, insurers, health care providers, etc. For health 
care providers, IT can not only help providers improve their productivity and financial-based performance measures, 
but it can also help them manage the risks associated with patient care. Yet, the effect of IT on firm-level risk is 
significantly understudied compared to its effect on productivity and performance, and it is of critical importance in 
a health care setting. We focus on a specific type of risk faced by hospitals: malpractice risk. 
We posit two paths through which health care IT might influence hospital malpractice risk: the control path and the 
discoverability path. It is widely accepted that IT can provide hospitals with greater control over the consistency of 
patient care and help reduce medical errors (Kuperman and Gibson 2003), which should help hospitals reduce their 
overall malpractice risk. However, IT creates an electronic paper trail of the care administered (or not) to a patient. 
The detail and relative immutability of this data may add to a hospital’s malpractice risk, as it could be used to show 
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negligence. Emerging research suggests that fear of this data being discovered (in the legal sense of the term) is 
delaying adoption of health care IT, thereby perpetuating inefficiencies in the health care system (Miller and Tucker 
2010). However, it is not clear whether this fear is founded. If it is, then policy changes are needed to remove this 
obstacle to modernizing the health care system. If it is not, then hospitals should move ahead with IT 
implementations to realize their benefits without being stymied by baseless fears. A key motivation of our study is to 
bring empirical evidence to help resolve this question. 
To that end, we examined the risk effects of health care IT by studying the relationship between Computerized 
Physician Order Entry (CPOE) and malpractice claims. CPOE automates the entry of patient care orders, such as 
ordering a surgical procedure, drug therapy, a consultation with a specialist, etc. Orders created within CPOE 
automatically become part of a patient’s electronic medical record. CPOE should improve patient care by reducing 
medical errors due to transcription problems, adverse drug interactions, etc., but it also increases the discoverability 
of the care administered. Thus, it is not clear whether CPOE increases or decreases a hospital’s malpractice risk. 
Our data consists of 2,015 malpractice claims filed against 136 hospitals in the state of Florida from 1999 to 2006. 
We matched these claims to data on hospital installation of CPOE and other health care information systems as well 
as hospital characteristics such as size, patient demographics, and adherence to accepted care practices. Hospitals’ 
installation of CPOE varied across this time span. This created a type of natural experiment in which we can observe 
malpractice claim activity for a given hospital both before and after its installation of CPOE, as well as claim 
activity across different hospitals, some of which had CPOE and some of which did not. 
Our results suggest that CPOE reduces malpractice risk for hospitals. It does so by lowering the number of claims 
filed against them, reducing claim severity, and speeding claim resolution. This benefits the hospital by lowering its 
malpractice exposure and the cost of processing claims, and it also benefits patients by lowering the severity of 
injuries and by speeding claim resolution. At the same time, there is no evidence to support the fear that CPOE has a 
positive effect on the number of paid claims or the payment amounts due to the discoverability of the data it 
produces. Thus, we find no evidence that hospitals should be reluctant to adopt CPOE because of discoverability 
concerns. On the contrary, the evidence supports the position that hospitals should move forward with CPOE 
implementation to benefit both the hospital and their patients. 
Theory and Hypothesis Development 
The business value of information technology within organizations has been an enduring and important research 
area for several years (Devaraj and Kohli 2003; Melville et al. 2004). The bulk of the research in this stream has 
analyzed IT's effect on productivity or financial-based performance measures (Kohli and Devaraj 2003). By making 
tasks more efficient and work processes more repeatable, IT is hypothesized to increase productivity (Brynjolfsson 
and Hitt 1996; Brynjolfsson and Hitt 2000; Mittal and Nault 2009). By providing better data for decision making 
and helping firms do more with less, IT is hypothesized to improve firm-level financial measures such as return on 
investment or return on assets (Bharadwaj 2000; Mahmood and Mann 1993). By contrast, few studies in this stream 
examine the relationship between IT investment and risk. Examining this relationship is particularly important in the 
health care context, as how a hospital manages its risk is arguably as important, if not more important, than how it 
manages its productivity and profitability. (In fact, profitability may be relatively less important in the health care 
context than in other industries, given the prevalence of non-profit organizations in this sector). Thus, one of the 
goals of this study is to examine how IT investment improves firm performance, not with respect to its productivity 
or profitability, but with respect to its ability to manage risk. 
Information Systems and Risk: There are many types of risk that firms face. The Society for Risk Analysis, a 
group of academics and industry practitioners dedicated to the study of risk analysis, defines risk as “the potential 
for realization of unwanted, adverse consequences to human life, health, property, or the environment; estimation of 
risk is usually based on the expected value of the conditional probability of the event occurring times the 
consequence of the event given that it has occurred” (http://www.sra.org/resources_glossary_p-r.php). 
Risk has been studied in IS research, but primarily in the context of the risk associated with implementing and 
managing IT, not with how IT might help a firm manage other types of risk, such as malpractice. One stream of IS 
research examines the risks inherent in information systems implementations, including why implementations fail 
(e.g., Benaroch et al. 2006; Keil et al. 2000; Lyytinen et al. 1998). A related stream of research has considered the 
relationship between the risk involved with IT investments and their return (Dewan and Ren 2007; Dewan et al. 
2007; Tanriverdi and Ruefli 2004). Another stream looks at IT-related risks such as data theft, denial of service 
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attacks, and identity theft (e.g., D'Arcy et al. 2009; Loch et al. 1992; Ransbotham and Mitra 2009; Straub and Welke 
1998). Coles and Hodgkinson (2008) elicited reactions to 18 IT-related risk scenarios. These scenarios pertained to 
topics such as compromised passwords or data, hardware / software failures, malware, bad implementation, or poor 
disaster recovery planning—but not to litigation risk. Similarly, Savic (Savic 2008) divided IT risk into four 
categories—security risk, availability risk, performance risk, and compliance risk—but did not consider litigation 
risk. Notably, few studies in this stream consider IT's relationship to the legal risk a firm faces. 
Malpractice Risk: In contrast, we focus on a specific legal risk faced by hospitals: malpractice risk. Malpractice is 
defined as “negligence, misconduct, lack of ordinary skill, or a breach of duty in the performance of a professional 
service (as in medicine) resulting in injury or loss” (Merriam-Webster's Dictionary of Law, 1996). Combining the 
definitions of risk and malpractice, we define malpractice risk in the health care context as the potential for 
realization of unwanted, adverse consequences to a patient’s health as a result of negligence, misconduct, lack of 
ordinary skill, or a breach of duty by a health care provider. Further, malpractice risk can be measured by examining 
the probability of a health care provider committing malpractice along with the consequences of the commission. 
Malpractice is a significant concern in health care. The consequences for the health care provider (in our case, 
hospitals) and for the patient differ. For the hospital, the consequences include financial loss due to the cost of 
malpractice insurance and processing claims, loss of reputation, and reduced morale and increased frustration among 
employees (Kohn et al. 2000). The United States Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that health care 
providers spent approximately 2 percent of their budgets in 2009 on malpractice insurance premiums, settlements, 
awards, and administrative costs not covered by insurance (http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/106xx/doc10641/10-09-
Tort_Reform.pdf). Although the CBO did not include specific estimates for hospitals, other evidence suggests that 
this percentage is a reasonable estimate for hospitals. New York City, for example, includes malpractice costs as a 
distinct line item in the operating budget for its municipal hospitals; approximately 2.5 percent of the budget is 
allocated for malpractice (http://council.nyc.gov/html/budget/PDFs/fy_10_exec_budget_hhc.pdf). Premiums for 
medical malpractice insurance rose 15 percent between 2000 and 2002, nearly twice the rate as total health care 
spending per person (Beider and Hagen 2004). Furthermore, while 2 percent of the operating budget is non-trivial, 
the non-financial consequences of malpractice such as low employee morale and damage to the institution’s 
reputation are arguably more severe for the hospital. For the patient, the consequences include loss of functional 
abilities, physical and/or psychological discomfort, disability, and death (Kohn et al. 2000). For both parties, the 
consequences are certainly “unwanted” and “adverse” and, in the case of the patient, sometimes incalculably large. 
Although IT holds substantial promise for helping hospitals manage malpractice risk, it is not clear what effect IT 
might have. On the one hand, IT can help a hospital improve its control over the care given to patients by 
standardizing care practices, helping to ensure that these practices are followed, and reducing medical errors (Balas 
2001; Dexter et al. 2001; Hersh 2004; Koppel et al. 2005; Menon et al. 2000). This should improve quality of care 
and thereby lower the malpractice risk of the hospital. On the other hand, IT increases the discoverability of the care 
given to patients by creating an electronic paper trail, including the exact timing and sequence of care procedures. 
Although this can be helpful in defending malpractice claims if care was properly administered (Miller and Glusko 
2003), it can serve as a “smoking gun” if it was not (Korin and Quattrone 2007). Thus, it is possible for IT to 
increase malpractice risk. Thus, the net effect of IT is not obvious and warrants empirical examination. Further, 
there are important policy issues on which an empirical examination can shed light. If hospitals are deferring IT 
investment for fear of a perceived discoverability risk (e.g. Miller and Tucker 2010),  then it is important to 
investigate whether this fear is founded. 
Computerized Physician Order Entry: We investigate a specific type of health care information technology in this 
study: computerized physician order entry (CPOE). The central thesis of this research is that there are two 
mechanisms, control and discoverability, through which CPOE influences malpractice risk. Prior to discussing these 
mechanisms and developing hypotheses regarding the relationship between CPOE and malpractice risk, we first 
define CPOE and describe its central features. 
 
 
 
 
 
Track 3: Economics and Value of Information Systems 
4 Thirty First International Conference on Information Systems, St. Louis 2010  
Table 1: Definitions of CPOE 
  Source   Definition  
 Academic  
(Kuperman 
and Gibson 
2003 p. 31)  
Computer physician order entry (CPOE) allows physicians to enter orders directly into a 
computer rather than handwriting them. Because CPOE introduces supportive technology into 
ordering — one of the key processes in medicine — it has the potential to address many quality 
problems. Computer physician order entry affords a health care organization opportunities to 
standardize practice; incorporate clinical decision support into daily practice; improve 
interdepartmental communication; facilitate patient transfers; and capture data for management, 
research, and quality monitoring.  
Industry  
(LeapFrog 
Group)  
Computerized physician order entry (CPOE) systems are electronic prescribing systems that 
intercept errors when they most commonly occur — at the time medications are ordered. With 
CPOE, physicians enter orders into a computer rather than on paper. Orders are integrated with 
patient information, including laboratory and prescription data. The order is then automatically 
checked for potential errors or problems. (http://www.leapfroggroup.org/media/file/Leapfrog-
Computer_Physician_Order_Entry_Fact_Sheet.pdf)  
 Community 
(Wikipedia)  
Computerized physician order entry (CPOE) is a process of electronic entry of medical 
practitioner instructions for the treatment of patients (particularly hospitalized patients) under 
his or her care. These orders are communicated over a computer network to the medical staff or 
to the departments (pharmacy, laboratory or radiology) responsible for fulfilling the order. 
CPOE decreases delay in order completion, reduces errors related to handwriting or 
transcription, allows order entry at point-of-care or off-site, provides error-checking for 
duplicate or incorrect doses or tests, and simplifies inventory and posting of charges. 
 
Table 1 provides definitions of CPOE from several sources. The defining feature of a CPOE system is the ability for 
physicians to enter orders electronically (Kaushal et al. 2003). Electronic order entry ensures that each order is 
entered in a standard way and eliminates legibility problems that plague hand-written orders. The order entry screen 
prompts the physician for information necessary for a complete order. Electronic orders are accessible to all 
members of the health care team (e.g., physicians, nurses, technicians) who have access to the system. Because they 
are electronic, orders are easily stored in a database (Kuperman et al. 2007). There are several types of orders that a 
physician might enter using CPOE, typically referred to as “order sets” (Han et al. 2005). The order entry screen for 
a given order set prompts the physician for all information necessary for the order. Perhaps the most common 
example of order placement via CPOE is ordering drug therapy for a patient; e.g., patient X should receive dosage Y 
of drug X twice a day. Other examples of orders are as follows:   
    • Intravenous drip for a patient, including the parameters of the mixture and flow rate.  
    • Consultation with a specialist (e.g., cardiologist, speech therapist) for a patient.  
    • Surgery for a patient, including scheduling and pre- and post-operative instructions.  
As indicated by the definitions in Table 1, most CPOE systems have an additional layer of functionality beyond 
basic order entry (Kuperman et al. 2007). They also provide decision support functions that prompt physicians if the 
medical order they are recommending may cause problems for the patient. For example, the CPOE system alerts the 
physician if s/he has ordered a drug to which the patient is allergic. CPOE also prompts physicians regarding the 
appropriate dosage levels for a patient, whether the patient is already taking a drug prescribed in the order (e.g., 
intravenously when the physician has prescribed it for oral use), and whether a prescribed drug will interact 
negatively with other drugs the patient is taking. In addition, if the physician orders a test for a patient, the CPOE 
system can provide the physician with historical results of the test for other patients with the same symptoms.  
Furthermore, CPOE systems are no longer restricted to physicians, but have evolved to include “prescriber”, 
“practioner” and “provider” as expanded interpretations of the “P” in the CPOE acronym.  
Why CPOE may affect malpractice risk—The control mechanism 
One of the major benefits of CPOE is the reduction of errors (Kuperman et al. 2007). The Institute of Medicine, in 
its oft-cited To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System report, defined an error as “the failure of a planned 
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action to be completed as intended or the use of a wrong plan to achieve an aim” (Kohn et al. 2000 p. 4). The report 
discussed two types of errors: a) errors of execution, in which a correct order is implemented incorrectly, and b) 
errors of planning, in which the order itself is incorrect. CPOE should reduce both types of errors in several ways. 
First, CPOE reduces errors of execution by eliminating problems associated with illegible or incorrectly transcribed 
orders. Second, the order sets within CPOE reduce errors of planning by requiring physicians to follow a series of 
steps when entering the order. This helps ensure that the order is entered correctly and enforces accepted standards 
of care. CPOE order sets also prompt physicians for required information, such as dosage and frequency for drug 
therapy, which also helps ensure that the order is complete. Third, CPOE reduces errors of planning by helping 
physicians avoid prescribing drugs that will cause adverse drug events such as drug-allergy and drug-drug 
interactions. CPOE also reduces errors of planning for non drug-related order errors, such as incorrect enteral 
nutrition (i.e., feeding tubes) orders (Gray and Goldmann 2004). 
The error reduction benefits of CPOE are generally accepted within the health care industry (Kuperman and Gibson 
2003). The Leapfrog Group—a consortium of private and public purchasers of health care insurance whose mission 
is to improve the safety, quality, and affordability of health care—recommends that hospitals follow four key quality 
and safety practices. The first of these is implementation of CPOE (Milstein et al. 2000). (See also 
http://www.leapfroggroup.org/media/file/FactSheet_LeapfrogGroup.pdf.) There is also evidence of the acceptance 
of the error reduction benefits of CPOE within the legal system. In a recent decision, a United States district court 
ordered a state-run hospital to implement CPOE because “implementation of a CPOE system should cause the 
delays and errors resulting from the current system to plummet” (Flynn vs. Doyle, 06-C-537, E.D. Wisconsin 2009). 
The functions of CPOE that reduce medical errors represent a control mechanism for hospitals. A simple definition 
of control is “power or authority to guide or manage” (Merriam Webster Collegiate Dictionary, 10th edition). CPOE 
gives hospitals the power to manage the order entry process by enforcing that orders are completed in a consistent 
manner, are legible, are complete, will not result in adverse events for patients, and are auditable. For the reasons 
stated above, the control afforded by CPOE to the hospital should reduce medical errors. 
Not all medical errors result in harm. Those that do are termed “preventable adverse events” (Kohn et al. 2000). 
They are “adverse” because of the associated harm, and they are “preventable” because they stem from an error that 
could have been avoided. Preventable adverse events generate malpractice claims (Studdert et al. 2006). They do not 
have to, as many patients never seek recourse, but there is a clear and direct relationship between preventable 
adverse events and malpractice claims. For example, there is general agreement that if hospitals reduce malpractice, 
then malpractice claims will drop (Baker 2005). Therefore, the control afforded by CPOE should reduce malpractice 
risk. 
Why CPOE may affect malpractice risk—The discoverability mechanism 
A patient who alleges malpractice must prove four elements (Phelps and Lehman 2005 Vol. 7, pp. 29-31). First, a 
duty of care was owed by the medical provider. Second, the provider violated the applicable standard of care. Third, 
the patient suffered harm. Fourth, the harm was caused by sub-standard care. Hospital records provide critical 
information for proving the second element, and by extension, the fourth element (Studdert et al. 2006). One method 
of gathering this information is discovery, which is a legal term that refers to “procedural devices employed by a 
party to a civil or criminal action, prior to trial, to require the adverse party to disclose information that is essential 
for the preparation of the requesting party's case and that the other party alone knows or possesses” (Phelps and 
Lehman 2005 Vol. 3, pp. 447-449). Information that is unknown cannot be disclosed and therefore is not 
discoverable. 
A feature of CPOE alluded to above is that orders are stored electronically. This creates a detailed history of the care 
provided to a patient, including the sequence of treatments, when they were administered, who ordered them, and 
whether any defaults or system prompts were overridden. Although some of this information may exist in a manual 
record (with the likely exception of whether defaults were overridden), the automatic logging functions of CPOE 
increase the likelihood of achieving a complete, accessible, and interpretable record. It greatly reduces the chances 
that details were changed after the fact and, if they were, they would be time-stamped and associated with a user’s 
account. Thus, CPOE makes the care received by a patient more discoverable. 
The discoverability generated by CPOE may either decrease or increase a hospital’s malpractice risk. It may 
decrease risk if care was properly administered, i.e., if the hospital adhered to an accepted practice of care (Gart 
2008; Swindle 2006). There are two reasons for this. First, a patient will be less likely to file a malpractice claim if 
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s/he suspects that the hospital will be able to produce compelling evidence that no standard of care was violated, i.e., 
that the hospital did not act negligently. Second, if the patient does file a claim, the hospital will be able to defend 
itself at trial. However, the discoverability of CPOE may also increase risk, particularly if the physician overrode a 
system prompt or deviated from a standard process of care. For example, a physician entering a drug order may 
receive an alert from the CPOE system that the drug is likely to interact negatively with another drug the patient is 
taking. It is somewhat common for physicians to ignore these alerts (Galanter et al. 2004), often because the 
potential benefit of the prescribed drug will outweigh the potential negative effect (van der Sijs et al. 2006). 
However, this decision can generate risk exposure for the hospital if it results in an adverse consequence for the 
patient. This is described well by the following quote from Korin and Quattrone (2007):  
Exercising clinical judgment, physicians may decide to override an electronic alert concerning a specific 
medication or choose a course of action that is not contemplated in a clinical guideline provided in the EHR 
[Electronic Health Record] system. A computerized prescriber [physician] order-entry system that requires 
users to document reasons for clinical overrides may generate documentary evidence, which can serve as a 
sword or a shield if the decision to override is questioned in a malpractice case or in peer-review proceedings.  
A recent court case provides a clear example of how an electronic history of care can potentially create exposure for 
the hospital. In Guzman vs. Memorial Hermann Hospital System (H-07-3973, S.D. Texas 2009), the plaintiffs 
argued that a hospital physician was negligent for not consulting a lab result he had ordered. As part of the discovery 
process, records in the computer system were used to show that the lab results were available in the system 25 
minutes before the physician checked the system. 
Thus, it is not clear whether the discoverability created by CPOE will increase or decrease malpractice risk. It is 
possible that the countervailing forces will cancel any effect of CPOE. This is consistent with a recent study 
indicating that the use of electronic health records, which are populated by CPOE, is not significantly correlated 
with the likelihood of paying a malpractice claim (Virapongse et al. 2008). 
Hypotheses 
We build on the previous detailed explanations of the control and discoverability paths to develop hypotheses for the 
effect of CPOE at two levels—the aggregate hospital level and the individual claim level. 
Hospital level hypotheses 
Based on the definition of risk provided above, malpractice risk can be measured by examining: a) the probability of 
a hospital committing malpractice, and b) the consequences of the commission. First, we use the number of 
malpractice claims filed against a hospital (after controlling for hospital size) as a proxy for the probability of the 
hospital committing malpractice. The control mechanism of CPOE should help hospitals reduce the number of 
malpractice claims by reducing the preventable adverse errors that lead to the claims. In addition, the presence of 
monitoring may itself encourage increased attention by physicians. The discoverability mechanism of CPOE, 
however, may either decrease or increase the number of claims, depending on whether the data recorded by CPOE 
represents evidence of appropriate care or of negligence. When the effect of discovery is coupled with the effect of 
control, the overall effect of CPOE on number of claims should be negative. Second, we use the dollar value of 
claims to measure the consequences of the commission. Using similar logic, CPOE should lower the amount of 
money paid for malpractice claims per year. This leads to our first hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1: For a hospital, CPOE reduces a) the probability of malpractice, as measured by the number of 
malpractice claims per year relative to hospital size, and b) the consequences of the commission, as measured by the 
dollar value of malpractice claims per year.  
Claim level hypotheses 
At the claim level, we cannot examine the probability of malpractice, but we can examine three distinct measures of 
the consequences of malpractice. The first is the severity level of malpractice claims. Claims range in severity from 
minor discomfort to death; i.e., there is a distribution of claim severity that ranges from low and high. Although 
CPOE may not eliminate all errors, the control mechanism of CPOE should eliminate many of the most egregious 
ones. For example, given practical limits on systems development, vendors of CPOE systems preferentially include 
 Ransbotham & Overby  / Does Information Technology Increase or Decrease Hospitals' Risk? 
  
 
 Thirty First International Conference on Information Systems, St. Louis 2010 7 
the most harmful drug-drug interactions and drug-allergy interactions in their systems. Thus, CPOE should shift the 
distribution of claim severities towards the low end. The discoverability mechanism of CPOE should not affect 
claim severity, because the completeness, detail, and accessibility of the care history does not affect whether the 
patient was harmed in a minor or major way. This leads to the second hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2: CPOE reduces the consequences of malpractice, as measured by the severity of individual 
malpractice claims.  
Two additional measures of the consequences of malpractice are whether a claim results in payment and the amount 
of payment. The control mechanism is not particularly salient for these measures. This is because the main effect of 
the control mechanism is to prevent malpractice; in the absence of malpractice, there will be no claim to resolve. 
The discoverability mechanism is more salient because the history of care provided the patient has a significant 
effect on whether the claim results in payment as well as the amount. As discussed above, the effect of the 
discoverability mechanism could be positive or negative, depending on the appropriateness of care. Without the 
benefits of the control mechanism and the associated health-related benefits of CPOE, the concern (Miller and 
Tucker 2010) is that the negative effects of discoverability will dominate and eradicate the benefits. Therefore, we 
test if CPOE will increase a) the likelihood of a claim resulting in payment and b) the amount of the payment 
through the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3: CPOE increases the consequences of malpractice, as measured by the likelihood of individual 
malpractice claims resulting in payment to the patient.   
Hypothesis 4: CPOE increases the consequences of malpractice, as measured by the amount paid for individual 
malpractice claims. 
Another measure of the consequences of malpractice risk is the length of time to resolve a claim. As above, the 
control mechanism is not salient for this measure. The discoverability mechanism is salient because the hospital can 
review the care history generated by CPOE to determine its position on a claim. If the hospital concludes that it was 
negligent, then it can offer a settlement relatively early in the process. If the hospital concludes that it was not 
negligent, then it will likely not offer a settlement and be willing to see the claim through the court system if 
necessary. In this case, the hospital will be able to handle the subsequent discovery requests expeditiously, speeding 
the overall process. In general, faster claim resolution is beneficial both to the patient and the hospital due to the real 
and opportunity costs associated with a lengthy process (Studdert et al. 2006). This leads to our final hypothesis.   
Hypothesis 5: CPOE reduces the length of time to resolve individual malpractice claims.  
Although the control mechanism is not posited to play a direct role in Hypothesis 3, Hypothesis 4, or Hypothesis 5, 
it will have an indirect influence through its effect on claim severity (Hypothesis 2). This is because claim severity 
should affect the likelihood of payment to the patient, the payment amount, and the number of days to resolution. 
In summary, we posit two paths, control and discoverability, through which CPOE influences malpractice risk. The 
control afforded by CPOE should be associated with fewer malpractice claims and lower severity for the claims that 
are filed. The discoverability aspect created by CPOE should affect the disposition of malpractice claims that are 
filed, including whether they result in payment to the patient, the payment, and time to resolve the claim. 
Data, Variables, and Methodology 
To test our hypotheses, we gathered data from four different sources. First, we gathered data on the installation of 
information systems (including CPOE) by hospitals from the Dorenfest Institute for Health Information databases1. 
Second, we augmented the Dorenfest information with hospital data from the State of Florida Agency for Healthcare 
Information. Third, we gathered data on hospitals' use of accepted practices for medical care from the Hospital 
Compare database maintained by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Fourth, we gathered data on 
medical malpractice claims from publicly available records. We matched data across the four sources to generate a 
sample of 136 hospitals and 2,105 claims. We focused our analysis on hospitals in Florida because the malpractice 
claim data we gathered is specific to this state. We provide additional detail about each data source below. 
Dorenfest Institute for Health Information: The Dorenfest databases contain detailed yearly information about IT 
                                                          
1The Dorenfest Institute for H.I.T. Research and Education, HIMSS Foundation, Chicago, Illinois, 2006. 
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installation in U.S. hospitals and have been used in prior IS research related to health care (e.g., Angst et al. 2010a; 
Angst et al. 2010b). The data is obtained through surveys of chief information officers and information systems 
managers and is augmented and verified by the Dorenfest Institute. The databases contain information on IT 
installation within each hospital as well as hospital-level descriptive data. We were able to determine CPOE 
installation information for 186 hospitals in Florida between 1999 and 2006. (The count of hospitals reduces to 136 
after matching across all data sources.) Within this time frame, 92 of these hospitals installed CPOE; the other 94 
did not. We use this data to measure the installation of CPOE and other information systems for each hospital. 
Florida Agency for Healthcare Information: As part of its oversight of the Medicaid program, the state of Florida 
Agency for Healthcare Information maintains detailed records on the healthcare facilities that operate within the 
state. In its annual report, the agency provides descriptive information (such as the number of employees, patients, 
doctors, and beds), statistical information (such as the percentage occupancy and average length of stay) and 
financial information (such as revenue and expense detail). Information for recent years (since 2007) is available 
online (http://ahca.myflorida.com/). For the years of our study (1999-2006), we obtained printed copies of each 
annual report. While the Agency has expanded the data within the report over time, our analysis includes only data 
collected consistently throughout the focal years of our study. We use this data to control for differences in 
individual hospitals other than information system adoption. Table 2 provides an overview of the hospital data. 
Hospital Compare: We collected data on hospital adherence to accepted care processes from the Hospital Compare 
database compiled by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (http://www.hospitalcompare.hhs.gov). 
This database includes the percentage of times a hospital administered an accepted practice care procedure to a 
patient with a given condition. For example, an accepted practice for patients who have suffered a heart attack is to 
provide them with aspirin within 24 hours before or after arrival at the hospital. The database contains data on 
hospital compliance with accepted practices for care for heart attacks, heart failures, pneumonia, asthma (in children 
only), and surgical infection. 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Focal Florida Hospitals (1999-2006) 
 Variable   Units  Minimum  Maximum   Mean  Variance  
Full time equivalent employees   (log of count)   4.79   9.41   6.95   0.668  
Working Hours / adjusted patient day   (US$)   16.91   39.51   24.34   23.647  
Salary / full time employee (FTE)   (thousand US$)   37.39   65.81   52.25   23.225  
Net Revenue / adjusted patient day   (thousand US$)   0.93   2.69   1.69   0.111  
Occupancy   (percentage)   0.12   0.89   0.56   0.019  
Total operating margin   (percentage)  -0.30   0.32   0.04   0.007  
Geographic index   (index)   91.26   104.42   100.05   9.724  
Case mix index   (index)   0.88   1.85   1.34   0.029  
Use of accepted practices   (index)   0.59   0.97   0.78   0.005  
 
The database is refreshed quarterly, and an archive of past databases is available at 
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/HospitalQualityInits/11_HospitalCompare.asp. Each database contains historical data 
collected 1.75 to 0.75 years prior. For example, the December 2008 Hospital Compare database contains data 
collected from April 2007 to March 2008. We used the September 2007 release of the database to gather data for 
calendar year 2006 and the September 2006 release for calendar year 2005. The archive does not include a database 
that covers calendar year 2004. To collect 2004 data, we took the average of the data reported in the May 2005 and 
December 2005 releases. The overall time span of these two database is October 2003 to March 2005. The May 
2005 release is the earliest release, so we were unable to collect data for calendar years 2003 or before. 
We only considered measures that were reported in all years. This eliminated the asthma measures and some 
surgical infection measures, which were added recently. This yielded the following data structure. For each hospital, 
we had 20 measures for each year from 2004 to 2006. The measures along with descriptive statistics for the 
hospitals in the state of Florida are withheld due to space limitations but are available from the authors. We limited 
the analysis to Florida hospitals in order to match the data with the claims data.  
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Four of the measures are not related to actual medical procedures administered in the hospital, including providing 
patients with discharge instructions or smoking cessation guidance. We conducted an exploratory factor analysis to 
investigate patterns within the data and found that these measures loaded separately from the other measures. Thus, 
we removed these factors from further analysis, as they do not measure the construct of interest. Cronbach's alpha 
for the remaining 16 measures is 0.71. We constructed a measure (UseOfAcceptedPractices) to reflect the 
consistency with which each hospital implemented accepted practices for quality of care by averaging their scores 
for the 16 measures. Missing values (in case a hospital did not report a measure) were treated as null. 
Malpractice Claims Data: The state of Florida requires licensed medical malpractice insurance providers to report 
on closed malpractice claims, pursuant to professional liability reporting statute Chapter 627.912, F.S. This data is 
public record and is made available through the Florida Office of Insurance Regulation at 
https://apps.fldfs.com/PLCR/Search/MPLClaim.aspx. We downloaded the 33,748 claims available through 2008, 
but focused our analysis on the 21,350 claims between 1999 and 2006. Claims may be filed against many entities 
(e.g. doctors, nurses, dentists, clinics, etc.); just over one-third of the claims (7,511) were against hospitals. We 
matched the claim data to the hospital data from our other sources. This yielded a total of 2,105 claims for which we 
had information systems covariates and 1,944 claims for which we had all covariates. Of these 2,105, 1,661 (79%) 
resulted in a payment to the patient. Payments averaged 218,000 US$ and were as high as 6.98 million US$. Claims 
are only reported once the final resolution is known; resolution takes on average 939 days. Therefore we limited our 
analysis to claims filed between 1999 and 2006. Claims filed after 2006 were likely to still be pending, and adding 
them to the analysis would create a censoring problem. Table 3 provides a descriptive overview of the claim data. 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for Focal Florida Medical Malpractice Claims (1999-2006) 
 Variable  Units  Minimum  Maximum  Mean  Variance  
Amount paid   (million US$)   0   6.981   0.218   0.240  
Paid indicator   (1 if paid)   0   1   0.789   0.167  
Settled in court   (1 if by Court)   0   1   0.060   0.057  
Severity category   (1 if Minor)   0   1   0.377   0.253  
Severity category   (1 if Significant)   0   1   0.057   0.054  
Severity category   (1 if Major)   0   1   0.209   0.165  
Severity category   (1 if Grave)   0   1   0.028   0.028  
Severity category   (1 if Death)   0   1   0.259   0.192  
Resolution time   (days)   1   4,262   939   334,340  
Variables 
We used the following dependent and independent variables in our study. All dollar amounts were adjusted to 
January 2000 equivalents using the Consumer Price Index as reported by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
Dependent Variables: We used different dependent variables to measure different effects of CPOE on medical 
malpractice. For the hospital / year level of analysis, we used two measures. CountOfClaims is the total count of 
claims against a hospital in the focal calendar year. AmountOfClaims is the total dollar value of the claims against a 
hospital for injuries in the focal calendar year. For the claim level analysis, we used four measures. First, each claim 
has a severity level associated with it. We created an ordinal variable called Severity to capture this. The levels of 
Severity are Slight, Minor, Significant, Major, Grave, and Death. Second, we used an indicator ClaimPaid to 
indicate if the malpractice suit resulted in a payment to the patient. Third, AmountPaid is the amount paid to the 
patient. Fourth, ResolutionTime is the natural log of the number of days between from the date the injury occurred 
until the final resolution was reported. 
Independent Variables: The focal independent variable is CPOE, which is a binary indicator indicating whether a 
hospital had CPOE installed or not. At the hospital / year level, CPOE = 1 if the hospital had installed CPOE in or 
before that year. This means that the CPOE variable can change across years for a given hospital if the hospital 
installed CPOE during the time span of the analysis. At the claim level, CPOE = 1 if CPOE was installed at the 
hospital at the time of the claim. One of the reasons we focused on the 1999-2006 period was that CPOE systems 
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became widely available during this time period. Also, the Institute of Medicine (Institute of Medicine 1999; 
Institute of Medicine 2001) published influential reports on patient safety and information technology during this 
time period calling for adoption of technologies like CPOE. Because there was little adoption of CPOE in 1999 (as 
reflected in the Dorenfest data), we began our data collection with this year to build a baseline of malpractice claims 
before the adoption of CPOE became more prevalent. 
Because characteristics of the hospital affect malpractice lawsuits, it is important to control for them. In our analysis, 
we use two alternative specifications to control for hospital level characteristics. In one specification, we use 
hospital level fixed effects and include indicator variables to control for aggregate hospital-level effects. 
Alternatively, we also report on empirical models that use extensive hospital level covariates. Employees is the 
natural log of the number of full-time equivalent employees at the hospital. This represents a measure of hospital 
size, which is important to include because larger hospitals are likely to have more claims filed against them. 
Employees is highly and positively correlated with other measures of hospital size in the hospital data, such as 
number of physicians, number of beds, number of staffed beds, number of visits, etc. Due to the collinearity among 
these variables, we used only Employees in the models. We include indicator variables for the hospital type such as 
general hospital or teaching hospital. Because the hospital governance may influence the number or type of claims, 
we include indicator variables for the type of governance such as for-profit, not-for-profit or governmental. We 
include a measure WorkingHoursPerAdjustedDay to reflect the staff attention that a patient receives. It is the total 
number of working hours available from the hospital employees divided by the patient load. Patient load is 
commonly measured in adjusted patient days, which is all of the acute care patient days plus the intensive care 
patient days adjusted by the ratio of inpatient revenue to total revenue. We include SalaryPerFTE to capture the 
average compensation per employee at the hospital. We include NetOpRevPerAdjDay which is the net operating 
revenue of the hospital divided by the patient load. Because a hospital's financial performance may influence the 
quality of care, we use TotalMargin, which is the ratio of revenue to expenses. Some hospitals operate a higher 
overall utilization that may affect care; therefore, we measure PercentOccupancy as the average number of beds that 
were in use throughout the year. Hospitals operate in areas with different underlying service populations. We reflect 
this through a measure GeographicIndex which is a rating the state of Florida uses to measure the variation in cost 
and services attributable to regional variation. Furthermore, hospitals treat different types of patients. We therefore 
include CaseMixIndex which is a diagnosis weighted average of the patients that the hospital treats. Finally, we 
incorporate the UseOfAcceptedPractices, as described above. (The UseOfAcceptedPractices measure is only 
available for 2004, 2005, and 2006. We used the 2004 value for records prior to 2004. None of the results are 
affected if we drop UseOfAcceptedPractices as an explanatory variable.) 
Characteristics of the claim itself influence the malpractice outcome. We control for these through three measures. 
First, as noted above, we include indicator variables for the severity of the patient's injury. In escalating order of 
severity, these are Slight, Minor, Significant, Major, Grave, and Death. Second, lawsuit outcomes may be affected 
by the original condition of the patient. For example, if a patient dies due to malpractice, it is likely that the outcome 
of the malpractice suit would differ if the patient was relatively healthy or if they were terminally ill when they 
entered the hospital. We reflect this through indicator variables for the original patient diagnosis. Third, we include 
an indicator variable Court representing whether the claim went to court or was settled beforehand. 
An information system like CPOE may not work in isolation. Therefore, we incorporated three other measures of 
information systems installed in the hospital at the time of the patient injury. First, we include an indicator for 
PhysicianDocumentation if the hospital had an automated system to manage the workflow of physician documents 
(e.g., Embi et al. 2004). We include a similar indicator for ClinicalDecisionSupport if the hospital had a system in 
place to try to assist physicians with decision making tasks (e.g., Garg et al. 2005). We include EnterpriseEMR if the 
hospital had an enterprise wide electronic medical record system.  Finally, we include an indicator for 
OrderCommunication if the hospital had a system to automate order communication. Each of these systems has 
features commonly found in CPOE; however, the distinction is that CPOE systems capture order entry by the 
physician at the time of patient treatment. Therefore, we are able isolate the effect of CPOE specifically by 
controlling for these other information systems. 
Installation of a CPOE system may be an endogenous choice. Therefore, we use an instrumental variable 
DocumentManagementSystem in the empirical models. A document management system is a non-medical system to 
automate documents involved in hospital administration. Therefore, hospitals with a propensity to adopt information 
systems in general may install both document management systems as well as CPOE. However, we expect no effect 
on health related outcome variables from adoption of administrative automation systems. 
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Table 4: Analysis of the Total Count and Dollar Value of Malpractice Claims per Hospital per Year 
 
Claim Count 
(All) 
Claim Count 
(Not Paid) 
Claim Dollar Value 
(Paid) 
Variable Model A1 Model B1 Model A2 Model B2 Model A3 Model B3 
Year indicators included included included included included included 
Hospital effects fixed cluster fixed cluster fixed cluster 
Hospital type indicators  included  included  included 
Governance indicators  included  included  included 
Constant -1.233** -4.716** -1.086 13.09 10.025*** 11.551*** 
 (0.604) (1.914) (0.890) (8.251) (0.791) (2.457) 
Number of paid claims      0.160*** 0.150*** 
     (0.017) (0.017) 
Employees  0.697***  0.590***  0.421*** 
  (ln)  (0.048)  (0.170)  (0.107) 
Working hours / adj days   -0.237***  0.151  0.099 
   (std)   (0.072)  (0.223)  (0.113) 
Salary / FTE   0.129**  0.395***  0.199*** 
  (std)   (0.060)  (0.145)  (0.076) 
Net Op Rev/ adj days   0.240***    -0.166   0.16 
  (std)    (0.070)   (0.195)   (0.101) 
Total margin    -0.016   -0.206   -0.208***  
  (std)    (0.030)   (0.030)   (0.069) 
Percent occupancy     0.060*     0.238**    0.076 
  (std)    (0.035)   (0.143)   (0.060) 
Geographic index    0.017   -0.186**    -0.001 
    (0.019)   (0.084)   (0.024) 
Case mix index    -0.085   0.646   -1.525***  
    (0.180)   (0.587)   (0.337) 
Use of accepted practices    -0.050   0.124   -0.019 
  (std)    (0.034)   (0.110)   (0.067) 
Enterprise EMR  0.207 -0.101 0.059 0.222 0.033 -0.127 
  (0.144) (0.101) -0.23 (0.296) (0.170) (0.134) 
Physician documentation  0.075  0.160**   0.512**  -0.045 0.189 0.126 
  (0.119) (0.075) -0.202 (0.248) (0.184) (0.127) 
Clinical decision support  -0.004 0.078 -0.478*   1.401**  0.261 0.312 
  (0.169) (0.132) -0.276 (0.567) (0.201) (0.210) 
Order communication  -0.135 0.103 -0.416*  -0.16 0.035 0.116 
  (0.166) (0.118) -0.247 (0.316) (0.198) (0.249) 
CPOE installation  -1.184**  -0.832**  -1.726**  -3.850***  -0.324 -0.246 
  (0.561) (0.419) -0.796 (1.117) (0.741) (0.684) 
Observations  1310 967 1310 967 1310 967 
Poisson regression on CountOfClaims and ClaimDollarValue using DocMgt as a instrument for CPOE; Number of observations changes due 
to availability of covariates; Standard errors in parentheses, (* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01); Models either include hospital fixed effects 
(models A) or errors clustered by hospital (models B) 
Results 
In our first analysis, we evaluated the effect of CPOE on the count of claims against a hospital. Table 4 shows the 
results of a Poisson regression using a panel of hospitals from 1999 until 2006 with DocumentManagementSystem as 
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an instrumental variable. Separate models were estimated using both fixed effect and hospital covariate models. In 
the total claim count models (columns 1 and 2), the coefficient for CPOE installation is significant in both the fixed 
effects model (β=-1.184, p<0.05) and in the covariate model (β=-0.832, p<0.05). Thus we find support for 
Hypothesis 1, indicating that there is evidence that CPOE installation decreases the count of claims filed against 
hospital. Furthermore, columns 3 and 4 describe the results restricted to the count of claims that do not result in 
payment.  We again find significant results.  However, in similar analysis restricted to claims resulting in payments 
(not reported), we do not find an effect of CPOE.   
This indicates that the claim reduction is coming from a reduction in claims that do not result in payment by the 
hospital.  We see no increase in the number of claims paid.  The reduction in unpaid claims represents a savings in 
legal and administrative cost.  It may be that plaintifs are less likely to file claims if they believe an automated 
system will show them as baseless. In the claim amount models (columns 5 and 6), the coefficient for CPOE 
installation is not significant in either the fixed effects model or in the covariate model, indicating that there is no 
evidence that CPOE installation changes the total amount of claims against a hospital. 
Next we analyzed the effect of CPOE on the severity of the claim reported. Table 5 reports the results of an ordered 
logistic analysis of claim severity. Separate models were estimated using both fixed effect and hospital covariate 
models. Indicators are included for hospital to control for unobserved heterogeneity in hospital characteristics. The 
coefficients for CPOE are significant in both specifications and indicate CPOE installation decreases the probability 
of the claim being at a higher severity level (β=-0.325 and β=-0.472). Using an example from the most extreme 
severity, the marginal effect of CPOE installation on the Death outcome is -10% (p < 0.001). The results reported 
are robust to alternative specification of error distribution (i.e. standard logistic or standard normal). However, while 
this analysis indicates that CPOE is associated with reduced claim severity, in isolation it could be that the overall 
number of claims increases and this increase is predominantly due to low severity claims. In other words, CPOE 
could be reducing overall severity only through an increase lower severity claims. However, the results reported in 
Table 4 show evidence of a decreasing number of claims. Therefore, this analysis supports Hypothesis 2 that CPOE 
reduces the severity of injuries reported in claims.  
We then analyzed the effect of CPOE on the likelihood that a claim results in a payment using a probit model and 
instrumenting CPOE. . Separate models were estimated using both fixed effects and hospital covariate models. We 
find no evidence to support Hypothesis 3 that CPOE installation significantly increases the likelihood that a claim 
will result in payment. Because the regression also includes the direct effects of the individual severity 
classifications (Minor, Significant, Major, Grave and Death), the effects of CPOE installation reported in these 
results are in addition to the indirect effects of CPOE installation through reduced severity. Thus, while we find no 
evidence of direct effect of CPOE installation on likelihood of payment, CPOE installation can reduce probability of 
payment by reducing claim severity. Furthermore, we see that if the claim reaches court, the likelihood that it will 
result in payment is significantly reduced (β=-1.653, p<0.001).  
Next we examined the effects of CPOE installation on the overall amount paid for the claim.  Separate models were 
estimated using both fixed effect and hospital covariate models. Because the dependent variable shows over-
dispersion, we examined alternative specifications using a log transformation and again use 
DocumentManagementSystem as an instrument. We do not find a significant relationship between CPOE and the 
amount paid from a claim. Claim payment is decreased if settled in Court (β=-0.038, p<0.05) and increases with 
increasing injury severity. We did not find support for Hypothesis 4 that CPOE installation increases the amount 
paid for a claim. We also test an alternative specification using the generalized method of moments with a negative 
binomial distribution and find similar results. Again, because the regression also includes the direct effects of the 
individual severity classifications, it is important to note that the effects of CPOE installation in these results are in 
addition to the indirect effects of CPOE installation through reduced severity. 
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Table 5: Analysis of the Severity of Malpractice Claims 
Variable Model A1 Model A2 Model B1 Model B2 
Hospital effects fixed fixed cluster cluster 
Hospital type indicators   included indicators 
Hospital governance indicators   included indicators 
Employees   0.005 0.038 
   (ln)   (0.113) (0.108) 
Working hours / adj day   -0.017 -0.010 
   (std)   (0.111) (0.109) 
Salary per FTE   -0.037 -0.026 
   (std)   (0.083) (0.079) 
Net Op Rev / adj day   0.036 0.052 
   (std)   (0.102) (0.103) 
Total margin   -0.064 -0.079 
   (std)   (0.062) (0.062) 
Percent occupancy   -0.103* 0.092 
   (std)   (0.057) (0.056) 
Geographic index   0.009 0.001 
   (0.021) (0.021) 
Case mix index   -0.158 -0.202 
   (0.375) (0.376) 
Use of accepted practices   0.051 0.049 
   (std)   (0.043) (0.042) 
Original diagnosis indicators included included included included 
Enterprise EMR -0.476* -0.197 -0.221* 0.192 
 (0.275) (0.166) (0.118) (0.117) 
Physician documentation 0.164 0.156 -0.389** -0.366** 
 (0.382) (0.219) (0.162) (0.163) 
Clinical decision support -0.504* -0.298* -0.148 -0.112 
 (0.300) (0.177) (0.185) (0.182) 
Order communication -0.452 -0.206 0.263 0.249 
 (0.463) (0.277) (0.537) (0.534) 
CPOE installation  -0.325*  -0.472** 
  (0.176)  (0.217) 
Observations 2015 2015 1944 1944 
Log likelihood -3041.654 -3039.896 -2844.384 -2842.032 
Wald χ2 209.331*** 213.791*** 191.220*** 209.667*** 
Ordered logistic regression on Severity (Slight, Minor, Significant, Grave, Major and Death); robust standard errors in parentheses, (* p<0.10; 
** p<0.05; *** p<0.01); Models either include hospital fixed effects (models A) or cluster errors by hospital (models B) 
 
Finally, we examined the effects of CPOE installation on the overall likelihood of malpractice claim resolution 
(Table 6). The first four columns show Cox proportional hazard models. Separate models were estimated both by 
allowing the baseline hazard rate to vary by hospital (stratified) and by including covariates and allowing variance to 
cluster by hospital. Overall, we find that CPOE significantly increases the likelihood that a claim will be resolved in 
both the stratified model (β=0.850, p<0.01) and the covariate model (β=0.593, p<0.01). Model C in the last column 
is an instrumented regression on the natural log of the number of days from the injury to the claim resolution. To be 
consistent, the sign of the estimated coefficient should be opposite in the hazard models and Model C; it is. Thus, we 
find support for Hypothesis 5. Because the data is not right censored, we can use this model to quantify the 
reduction in resolution time; the effect of CPOE is significant (p<0.05) and large (β=-1.677)— considering that the 
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average is 939 days to resolve a claim, CPOE installation reduces the average by two years. Because the regression 
also includes the direct effects of each severity classification, the effects of CPOE in these results are in addition to 
the indirect benefits of CPOE through reduced severity; increased severity increases resolution time in all models.  
Table 6: Analysis of Malpractice Claim Resolution 
Variable Model A1 Model A2 Model B1 Model B2 Model C3 
Hospital effects stratified stratified cluster cluster cluster 
Hospital type indicators   included included included 
Hospital governance indicators   included included included 
Constant     6.175*** 
     (1.504) 
Employees   0.058 0.046 0.164* 
   (ln)   (0.096) (0.103) (0.089) 
Working hours / adj day   0.036 -0.008 -0.006 
   (std)   (0.107) (0.111) (0.061) 
Salary / FTE   0.145** 0.134** -0.050 
   (std)   (0.065) (0.063) (0.042) 
Net Op Rev / adj day   0.050 0.029 0.024 
   (std)   (0.080) (0.080) (0.054) 
Total margin   -0.026 -0.010 -0.015 
   (std)   (0.056) (0.056) (0.036) 
Percent occupancy   -0.014 -0.004 -0.041 
   (std)   (0.050) (0.050) (0.031) 
Geographic index   -0.040** -0.034** -0.003 
      (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) 
Case mix index   0.300 0.367 -0.395** 
   (0.338) (0.331) (0.197) 
Use of accepted practices   -0.308*** -0.301*** 0.188*** 
   (std)   (0.040) (0.040) (0.021) 
Original diagnosis indicators included included included included included 
Court settlement -0.897*** -0.890*** -0.828*** -0.820*** 0.464*** 
 (0.116) (0.116) (0.119) (0.118) (0.067) 
Severity: minor -0.439*** -0.449*** -0.306*** -0.388*** 0.316*** 
 (0.102) (0.102) (0.115) (0.113) (0.090) 
Severity: significant -0.948*** -0.941*** -0.880*** -0.861*** 0.647*** 
 (0.141) (0.141) (0.175) (0.177) (0.108) 
Severity: major -0.579*** -0.588** -0.507*** -0.496** 0.323*** 
 (0.108) (0.108) (0.119) (0.117) (0.098) 
Severity: grave -0.768*** -0.758*** -0.721*** -0.701*** 0.490*** 
 (0.170) (0.170) (0.171) (0.175) (0.138) 
Severity: death -0.746*** -0.764*** -0.627*** -0.630*** 0.537*** 
 (0.107) (0.107) (0.115) (0.114) (0.093) 
Enterprise EMR 1.559*** 1.343*** 0.029 -0.020 -0.093 
 (0.203) (0.210) (0.093) (0.094) (0.081) 
Physician documentation 1.582*** 1.447*** 0.347** 0.331** -0.328*** 
 (0.300) (0.294) (0.164) (0.157) (0.096) 
Clinical decision support 1.448*** 1.370*** -0.095 -0.142 0.146* 
 (0.230) (0.233) (0.156) (0.156) (0.081) 
Order communication 1.262*** 1.182*** 0.652** 0.694** -0.273 
 (0.373) (0.378) (0.302) (0.304) (0.188) 
CPOE installation  0.850***  0.593*** -1.677** 
  (0.210)  (0.148) (0.825) 
Observations 2105 2105 1944 1944 1944 
Log likelihood -5236.803 -5228.990 -12541.055 -12530.809  
χ
2
 383.481*** 399.107*** 529.520*** 416.692*** 488.34*** 
R2     13.16 
Models A and B are Cox proportional hazard models on the risk of claim resolution; Hazard models either allow hazard curves to vary by 
hospital (stratified, models A) or cluster errors by hospital (models B); Model C is a regression on the natural log of days to resolution with 
DocumentManagementSystem as instrument for CPOE; robust standard errors in parenthesis. (* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01) 
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Discussion and Conclusions 
We studied the effect of hospital CPOE installation on closed medical malpractice claims from the state of Florida. 
Overall, our research finds benefits from CPOE installation both through a control mechanism (reduced number of 
claims and severity) and through a discoverability mechanism (reduced time to claim resolution). We found support 
for a reduction in claim count from CPOE installation and no increase in the dollar value of claims or the likelihood 
of payment. Our findings point to four broad conclusions. 
IT's effect on risk: While most studies of the business value of IT in organizations focus on productivity or 
performance, an arguably more important outcome in healthcare is risk. IT has the potential to reduce risk, 
particularly risk associated with patient care. Our findings show that CPOE helps hospitals reduce risk by decreasing 
claims and reducing the severity of claims. Due to the importance of managing risk in healthcare organizations, 
more research into how IT can be used to accomplish this is needed. 
Additional aspects of risk through discoverability: While some aspects of IT risk (e.g. security, availability, 
performance, and compliance) have been identified and studied, IT adoption can increase the discoverability of 
information and will either lead to or mitigate risk. This effect on risk has not been well-studied. More so than other 
risks such as security, discoverability can be a “sword or a shield” (Korin and Quattrone 2007). Recent research 
finds that hospitals are avoiding CPOE installation because of discoverability fears (Miller and Tucker 2010); we 
find no evidence that this concern is warranted. Beyond the clear implications for practitioners, we need additional 
research to identify the dimensions within the discoverability construct and to provide deeper normative guidance. 
Discoverability benefits and costs: In the healthcare context, beyond the potential benefits on patient safety, 
reducing injury severity has secondary tangible benefits through reduction in medical malpractice payments. Based 
on prior research, we theorized that the discoverability mechanism of CPOE installation would have both benefits 
and costs. Through increased discoverability, IT could provide evidence which could be used against an installing 
organization. However, IT could also provide greater clarity, allowing resolution of issues more quickly. Using 
metrics where discoverability can have both benefits and costs (i.e. likelihood of payment, amount paid), we found 
no evidence that benefits outweigh costs or vice versa. It may be that each approximately offsets the other. However, 
using metrics where discoverability has solely expected benefits (resolution time), benefits of CPOE are seen. In the 
healthcare context where “the overhead costs of malpractice litigation are exorbitant” (Studdert et al. 2006 p. 2024), 
the substantial reduction in resolution time has the potential for substantial reduction in costs (Kaushal et al. 2006). 
These savings are available independent of the positive or negative conclusion of the claim. The increased 
information available could be used strategically by hospitals to selectively accelerate or postpone resolution. 
Secondary effects of IT: In a broader sense, our research quantifies benefits and costs beyond the primary effects of 
IT. While error reduction is the primary focus of patient safety initiatives, we illustrate an additional mechanism at 
work that, in this context, provides additional benefits. Discoverability has a secondary effect by reducing time to 
resolve a claim. Secondary effects are not necessarily beneficial; regardless, they should be considered in assessing 
the overall effect of IT. Our research identifies one key secondary effect but points to the need for deeper analysis. 
Several limitations bound these conclusions. First, our study focuses on claims within a single state (Florida). While 
this allows us to control for variation in state law and demographics, there may be significant differences between 
states and countries. For example, many states have laws that are more conducive to electronic discovery than 
Florida (Miller and Tucker 2010). More research is needed to understand the broader variations in claim practices. 
In addition, because of the need to match data across multiple sources, we do not have a random sample of hospitals 
within Florida. (This type of issue is common in research that relies upon secondary data. For example, it affects 
virtually any study that matches firm data to Compustat data.) However, we have no reason to believe that the 
hospitals in our sample are structurally different than other hospitals. Second, we observe only closed claims; claims 
which have not reached a final resolution are not seen. By limiting our analysis to claims that occurred prior to 2006 
and including time-based indicators, we believe we have limited the effect of any potential bias. Third, a common 
limitation in research on IT business value is that the IT investment decision is endogenous to the outcome variable 
due to unobserved heterogeneity in the investing firm. Hospitals providing lower quality care may be less likely to 
adopt CPOE.  We have addressed this issue in our study by including hospital-level fixed effects and indicator 
variables in our models. Fourth, we do not observe actual CPOE usage; instead, we see installation of CPOE. It is 
likely that there is heterogeneity in usage of installed systems (Devaraj and Kohli 2003). While our measure for 
usage of accepted processes may control for some general tendency to adopt, we do not have a measure of actual 
CPOE usage. An interesting research topic would center on this issue—does having a system but not using it 
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increase legal risk more than not having a system at all? Finally, we focus on the effect of CPOE on hospitals 
themselves. The effect on other stakeholders is not known and may differ from our findings. In the healthcare 
context, the multiple entities involved (e.g. doctors, nurses, insurers, etc.) are each potentially affected by the CPOE 
installation decision of the hospital. This is particularly important in the context of systems installed by one entity, 
but adopted primarily by another (Kohli and Kettinger 2004). Further research is needed to clarify the effect on the 
multiple entities and provide normative guidance. Additionally, the fundamental model and theoretical mechanisms 
can be applied outside the healthcare context. 
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